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Honorable Tae Wan Son
Minister of Reconstruction
Seoul, Korea
Dear Minister Tae:
In the work assignment which you gave me wi th your letter
of March 4, 1961, three problems were raised:
1. Consideration of al ternati ve theoretical approaches
to economic development involving: (a) a li-' f\j n11mber of
sectors, and (b) a large number of sectors, a~. "he relative
applicabili ty to Korean condi tions of these different
approaches.
2. Evaluation of the draft statement by the Economic
Development Council on -Method and Principles of the New
Pive-Year Economic Development Plan,- and suggestions for
revising it.
3. A brief appraisal of current proposals for the re-
organization of economic planning in the Korean government.
A copy of your original letter of March 4, with the
attached work assignment, is included at the end of this
report as Appendix 1.
The present report is essentiallY an attempt to respond
to these problems, wi th emphasis on the first two. I have
also included some observations on certain aspects of the
Korean economic si tuation which seem to me to differentiate
it from many other Asian countries, and to be particularly
relevant to the ta~k of formulating Korea's firstPive-Year
Economic Development Plan.
The attached report is divided into four parts. Part I
____ C9n8 tS.t~ _OJ9()_~.,njJL~H'L~Jn·.tlQl11"1'_.JlnKtLQ!_.t.h.L-_e.c.onom1 e-
o situation, which I feel are espeoially relevant to develop-
ment planning in Korea. The last three partl take up the
problems railed in the Maroh " work a•• ilnment: Part II
dealing with multi-sector versus key-sector growth; Part
m with ·~Ugg~s·ti~~;·'for revising the EDC statement on
-Method and Principles·; and Part IV dealing very briefly
wi th my reactions to the proposed reorganization of ec-onomfc
planning in Korea. I have also included, as AP~endixes 2
and 3, two technical memoranda on normalization of interest
rates, and investment priori ties, whi ch I wrote in response
to requests from the Ministry of Pinance, and the Economic
Development Council., .respectivelY.·
. ' ".,' " .
I should say q.uite frankly that time limi tations have
precluded my dealing with these several problems in as de-
tailed, th'or'ough, and informed a JJianne~ as I would have liked.
Nevertheless·,: I feel 'that· the month I have been in Korea has
~'eenmadebotkmore.productive ~nd more 'pleasant as a result
of the candor,~ cooperation, 'and assistilnce, provided 'to me
by members of your staff, as well as of other gove'rnment
agencies. I'wou-ld like to acknowledge'especial'ly the coopera-
tion I have received from Daniel Lee, of the Ministry of
Reconstruction, Kim Chong Dai of the Economic'Devel~pment
Council, Lee Hahn Been of the Ministry of Pinance, Ahn Jong
Jik of the B.ank of Korea,.. and.Lee Byung Joon and Hong Sung
H~ ot .t,he Korean Reconstruction Bank,. And from. my able
assistants, Lee Duck Soo and Lee Hwa Kyun, of the Ministry of
Reconstruction.plnalll, I wish to 'thank the USOM staff for
their assistanc'e, 'and William Eilers and 'the 'Asia Poundation
whose sponsorship and financing made my consultat1..Q.DJllle
possible. Needless to say, none of the,se worthy . gen~~~Dten
oi" organizations shares responsibility' for the views and
suggestions :~~'nt-ained in this report. .
, ~ '. - . .
Sincerely, .
CSlY
Charles. Wol.f., .Jr.. ·
Iconomic Adyis~r.
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SOME ASPECTS OF THE KOREAN ECONOMIC SITUATION
RELEVANT TO A NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN
1. R.ecetlt Growth "'tel
In the put four years, &om 1957 through 1960, the average annual rate of growth
in Korea's national product in constant prices has been about 5 per cent. But more
significant than this tRIIf'tll' growth rate, is the fact that the annual rate of growth has
steadily diminished over the four year period. Granted the statistical uncertainties that
are involved, the Bank of Korea data show that the growth in real GNP was 8.6 per
cent in 1957, 6.9 per cent in 1958,5.2 per cent in 1959, and 2.3 per cent in 1960. (Assum·
ing that the rate of growth in population was either constant or increasing during this
period, per capita output would show an even sharper relative decline in growth rate.)
Over this four year period, groa fixed capital fonnatioD remained at about 13 per
cent of GNP. This implies that the capital-output ratio for the economy as a whole
has been gradually rising. The same input of fixed capital, as a percentage of GNP
has, in other words. yielded a steadily diminishing percentage increase in real output,
implying that the efficiency of capital use has been steadily declining.
These factom are of considerable significance in setting growth targets for the new
plan that will be reasonable and realistic. The Pl'Qlpective five-year plan conCronts not
only the problem of raising the abolute rate of growth, but of reversing the sharply
downward trend that has 'characterized the put four years.
2. Market IlIlperfecdou aDd JUaiclidei
All underdeveloped econ~ are characterized in greater or lesser degree by
imperfections in the functioning of the market mechanism. These imperfections UIUally
refteet strong cultural, and IOcial traditions, and constitute a significant handicap to
accelerated growth. Korea hu its fair share of such traditional impertectiODJ and rigidities.
However, in comparision with other underdeveloped countries. what strikes me par-
ticularly about Korea is the extent to which these traditional and long-standing imper-
fections and rigidities are accompanied by many other more recently created imperfections.
Taken together, the newly created rigidities constitute perhapl an even greater obItacle to
accelerated growth than the standard and typical traditional rigiditiel. Let me cite lOme
IpeclIiC examples: .
L Korea i. ahead of many underdeveloped countries in havinc a fairly elabonte network
of relatively lal'le.lCa1e IOvemment enterprilel. But what strikes one mOlt about them II that,
______..QHhe .ist~ major mterprillel, nine "'owed I net 'OIl! jn their 191!O 'n"""e••nd.o1ltpt ,..temeh
and three othen returned a profit on total pernment equity lell than 6 per cent, which II
probably IOmethiq below 25 per cent of the opportunity COlt of capital
b. The Itrueture of interest rates on loanl extended by IO"fDment lendiq inltitutiOlll,
notably the Korean R.econltrUetion Bank and the Korean A,riculture Bank, coven a wide ra.
between 3 ud 15 per cent. Widely diJfereDt rates are often clwged to different borrowers from
the same kind of loan. or even to the wune borrower at diJfereDt times, depending upon whether
the source of loanable funds is from counterpart. reconstruction bonds, or uy one of a dozen
other special funds. I Such a structure of interest rates has a strong tendency to permit ud
sustain inefficient enterprise. as well as to facilitate the allocation of scarce capital on grounds
that do not maximi~ economic growth. .
c:. The price of coal ud fertilizer charged by the govemment is the same in all parts of
the country. This kind of pricing system implies that transportation is a free service; conse·
quently it has the effect of promoting a greater utilization of coal ud fertilizer in areas
more distant from production centers. ud a lesser utilization in areas dose .to the production
centers. than efficient allocation would warrant.
. .' Fro~ the standpoint of accelerating Korea's long term growth, .it is. probably as
important to eliminate or reduce suc-h imperfections and rigidities as to increase thc
quantity of real capital formation.
5. EcOtloaUc Compedd01l With North Korea
One can as easily overemphasize as overlook the importance of the economic com~
petition between South and North Korea, in formulating a reasonable development
plan. The danger of overlooking it is fairly obvious. If the developmental performance
of South Korea is grossly inadequate in comparison with that in North Korea, public
confidence in the South Korean government can be sapped with consequences that
might be disruptive of political stabilty.
But there is also a danger of overemphasizing· this competition, or of misconstruing
its.Significance. In some sense, the "welfare" content of a unit of growth in economies
with a reasonable amount of free choice is substantially greater than the welfare content
of a similar unit of growth in controlled economies. The point is simply that, for
growth to have a meaningful "welfare" content, it has to be in response to or in
reflection of consumer preferences. Since these preferences usually do not appreciably
influence ·the direction of growth in.controlled economies, such economies may grow
rapidly in numerical terms at the same time IS they procIucea m~ less. than propor'
tionate increase in welfare or satisfaction for the people· living. under them.
Moreover, there are various statistical ~ties in regard to North Korean growth
data which tend to inflate the' growth that is reported. What I· have in mind here it
not limply the use of data for propaPnda purposes, but mthcr the tendenclci in
Communist accounting practices to mcasure· growth in tcrms of gram value, ~cluding
intermcdiate productl, rather than value added. 'this practice often hal the effect of
substantially inBating the' magnitude of any ar:tual increases in o~tput thAt occur.
The general intereitce I would draw from these OM:! vationa is that it ii neither
necesmry nor likely that South Korea equal the overall growth rate reported by North
Korea, but, in .regard to growth in physical production i:n particular sectors or commo-
dities, it it eu~tial.that.-1'!>~!h_~c:Jr.~!Lsho~!L~"ce1A~ I~Lm·_lOII1e. Plan formulation
Ihould be approached with thiJ concept in mind.
I Appendix 2 COIltain. a memorandum written to Mr. Lee Hahn Been, Dir«tor of the
Budlet Bureau, on lllterelt rate Ilormali~.ationf ill whieh thl. problem i. dileOuedat greater length.
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The division of the country has another implication for plan formulation. Given
what seems to be the reasonable assumption of continued divison for the indefinite
future. the plan should reflect a readiness to incur some investment CClI1:S for purpClRS
that might not be competitive if unification were achieved. At the same time. the
country's division would seem to suggest that. where possible. effort should be made to
avoid overbuilding industries that might not be competitive if unification were to occur
subsequently.
Moreover. while the plan should not rely on any resumption of trade between South
and North Korea beca1Be of the obvious uncertainties that are involved. it may very
well be possible and economically desirable at lIOIJ1e future time to consider particular
trading arrangements. The economically sensible bI.1is for such trade might be in
relation to an exchange of commodities which. from the atandpoint of what South
Korea (..otains from the North. could always be imported from alternative lIO\1f'CeI of
supply outside the country. It might be beneficial to consider. for example. an exchange
of South Korean rice for North Korean fertilizer. but would not be desirable to consider
exchanging rice for electric power.
4. The Def'eue Burdell
Although Korea has the largest number of men under I.1'lDI of any underdeveloped
country in the free world. I believe the burden this imposes on the Korean economy
has often been oventreaed. Actually. I have been impreued by the extent to which
defense support aid not only compensates for the military burden. but. over and above
such compensation. prOvides l'eBOUl"ceI which are available for expanding capital forma'
tion. Thus. appoximately 95~ of the direct operating COItI of Korea', defeme eatablilh·
ment are bome from counterpart fundi at the preaent time. and virtually all equipment
COlts are home from military aid fundi. For the current fiacal year. about one third of
total non-project defense support plus project defense IUport plUl Public Law 480 aid
iJ exc:eu to the defense budget', requirementl.
Of coune. there are variOUl hidden coati impOled by the military effort which are
not reflected in defense outlays. Some of the country', beat executive and managerial
talents are probably in the military at salaries below their economic value to the economy
in alternative civilian oc:cupationl. I have been told. too. that the low pay of IOldim
iJ often supplemented by income tramfen from their families. in effect conatituting a
conceal'=CI tax burden on the families. And there ... • plYchologica1 alit which iJ even.
more difficult to estimate: the "alit" repretented by draftees who return to their villages
after military aerviCe unwillinr to remme their pUN Jile yet unable to cb much eJIe.
At the ame time. however. there are hidden benefits conferred by the military
effort which are Iimilarly not reSected in the defeme budget. The liteluy tnining and
at least lOme of the skills imputed by military service do reault in increued labor pro-
ductivity and eunmg poWer later on. More -tangibly. the obIolelCellce or military
equipment. financed (rom military aid fundi. provides a large and cheap IOUn:e (,'f acrap
iron and aceel that benefita the indUltrial lector to a conaidemble extent.
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-ObvioWy. it is very diBicult to make any l"'diable estimate of most of these concealed
costs and t.;ne1its to see whether there is U'..·f net additional burden on the economy
imposed bY-the military effort. In any event. it is clear that military expenditures of
165 billion hwan are large (one-third of the 1961 national budget). Quite ~part from-
the qutstion of whether the military effort imposes a net burden, from the standpoint
cf Korea's economic development, it would seem that the more important question to
ask is how can the military complement the Five-Year Plan and assist the country's
growth? 1 WiiI RitUm to tIUs impOrtant ciu~tion later.' - -
. ~ . . .
5. COJII1UDU-GtlOdJ Aid Vemu Capical-Goods Aid
There has been and is much discussion in Korea concerning the fact that 13 billion
of post-war U.5. aid has been "w..ated" because it has been largely used (or consumer-
goods which have inftated consumption levels, raised aspirations, and made the Korean
economy a -dependent one. Had capital goods been imported, it is said, the situation
would have been different, and the economy would now be in better condition.
The economic reasoning behind these arguments is weak, and should be clarified in
order to encourage constructive thinking and planning for Korean development. In an
effort to contribute toward such clarification, three points should be briefly stressed,
aIthough to develop them fully would require considerable elaboration: (1) Most of the
difficulties and "wastage" arttributed to consumer-goods imports are not appropriately
attributed to them at all. In large measure. the importation of consumer-goods was
related to a need to finance the military effort, and -this Was a need the capital-goods
imparts,- of-equivalent amount, could not haw met. (2) From the standpoint of efficient
use of resources. any given amount of developmental aid should ItDt be strictly confined to
ftt1llr consumer-goods or capital-goods. It abould be used flexibly, with Varying com·
binations of both sorts of goods related to different projects, in an effort to provide a
particular productive ailet or project in Korea at minimum COlt. Confining aid to
capital-goods can create project inefficiencies and niisaIIocations 81 great as thc.e created
by confining aid to coiuumu-goods. -(3) In thc.e cues, where. unfortunately, available
dollar aid is ftOt subject to flexible use, but is. for example, confined to surplus agrkultural
commodities, the exercise of appropriate tax and expenditures poHcies by the Korean
government, should permit the "convenion" of the consumer-goodl into capital
formation in Korea, though the dollar value of the new capital- will be lea than the
nominal dollar value of. the agricultural surpiUleS. Accomplilhing this "convenion" is
easier- mid than clone. But the principle is • valid and operational one, and should be
borne in mind -in determi.ninI the -extent to which- tome -omsumel gooda imports in-
the, future- can be effectively translated into capital formation rather than additional
Consumption.
--- ---6. Keenealitiiloauy Treacli- -------------- - ----------- -- ------------.--
_In·_ .the -~ four yean, 1957 to 1960., the wholesale price index has risen by over
1 See pp. t4-t5 below. -
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20 per cent. Excluding grain prices. wbolesaIe prices have risen by over 40 per cent.
Although inflation can anetimes be a source of forced savings for investment pur-
pclIIeS. and consequently can make a contribution to accelerated growth, it is an extremely
risky technique and one which, in the c:ase of Korea. should be scrupulously controlled.
Apart from the problem of balance of payments rer ...,"CUlISions, and the generally inequi-
table impact of the forced savings burden on different segments of the population.
inftation tends to distort seriously the resulting pattern and type of investment. Specifi-
cally, long term investment tends to be discouraged because or uncertainties concerning
the probable trend of relative commodity prices in the future. Because, under inflationary
conditions. changes depreciate so large a fraction of the monetary yield of new invest·
ment, mistakes in estimating the future pattern of relative commodity prices can be
very COItly to new investors. Consequently, they will tend to avoid long term invest·
ment which would be particularly sensitive to such mistakes. Effective and extensive
participation by the private sector in long term development thus requires an expecta-
tion of reasonable stability in the price level. For a country like Korea. which has an
active and importan~ private sector, reasonable price stability should be a clearly re-
cognized adjunct to a successful deveIopment plan.
7. Korea'. Adnllu,eI aad Diladnllu,eI fa Rel.doll to Other
Ullderd"eloped Co.IlUia fa Alia
One is quickly aware of lOme of the disadvantages which Korea races in planning
its economic development compared to other Asian countries. The high rate of popula-
tion growth (over 2.2 per cent), the low percentage of arable land (about one fifth)
and the relatively rigorous climatic conditions are some obvious disadvantages in com-
parison. for example. with Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, or Thailand.
But there are a1Jo lJOme important advantagea and they are perhapl leu evident. The
size of the manufacturing and construction sector in relation to GNP is fairly large
compared to other undeveloped countries of equivalent size, and this would appear to
provide 1'1 good buil for further growth. In terml of government inftuence on the acale
and pattern of capital formation, development institutions and techniques are already in
existence for exerciJing IUCh influence, e.g. through the counterpart accountl, the KRB,
KAB. and the government enterpriJes. In other countries such institutions need to be
created. while Korea iI in a poIition to build on a foundation which already exiltl.:. I
At the aame time, Korea hu a relatively active, and potentially still more active. private
leCtor in the indUItriaI field which can be a powerful force in the country', development.
I In 1958 and 1959, 35-40. or IfOII capital formation was financed through IOvernment
inltitution.. includilll the mare ~~ by the deficit on current account, which 11 in efec:t
channelled to private enterprile thl'OUlll. IOvernment lendiDI inltitutiODl. However, u previoUily
mentioned (pp. 1-2~). there IIf!f.m to be """. J'PIIOJ!' for bel'e'd", thet "rtbre \&Ie or
theae imtitution. and technique. to ..ure .:.~<:ient inveatment choieeJ ha. not yet been ac:c:om.
pliahed. In fact, beaUIe or the .ile and power of theae iDititutlons, miJaUoc:atiODl and ineflldencie.
on the part of the IOvemment can be much more COItly and detrimental to Korean develop-
ment than in c:ountris where the inltitu~on. do not eKiJt or are lell InfluentiaL
s
Finnlly, though the resources available for· industril-J development are not abundant, coal.
tungsten. and other minerals provide a relatively promising basis for long term industrial
growth.
The road to self-sustained economic growth in Korea will be a rough one. but at
least some of the grades are less steep than they are in other Asian countries.
II
APPRAISAL OF MULTI·SECTOR VERSUS
KEY·SECTOR GROWTH CONCEPTS
I rather doubt . that it is either necessary or desirable· to go into ~n extended dis·
cussion of the theory and the extensive literature· on this subject. To do so would
require a short monograph. which I am not about to write. Instead. it may be more
relevant· to try lo sl1l'JUJ1arize briefly the ma:n points that ar.:: involved in the theory of
multi-sector or balanced growth. than to summarize the main points that underlie the
theory of key-sector or unbalanced growth. and finally to suggest some implications of
these points Cor Korea's own development plan.
1. Multi-8ector or Balanced Growth .
Underlying the balanced growth argument is the view that industries and sectors of
the ·economy ~ closely related to each other. both·as sources C?c inputs and. markets Cor
outputs. Consequ~tly. an attempt to develop one or two or only a very few sectors at
a· time will run into serious snags. because the few sectors or industries that are em'
phasized will encounter shortages of inputs (Cor example. if the development of steel
capacity were to exceed the expansion of coal capacity). and often more important.
shortages of demand. In the latter case. for example. an expansion of agricultural out·
put might result simply in lower prices for farm products unless output and income. in
indurtry and other sectors were simultaneously rising· so as to provide a wide domestic
market for rising agricultural output. or course. it can be argued that increuing..export
should provide an alternative way of widening the market. and that increasing imports
should provide an alternative .source of inputs in the event that balanced interindustry
growth does not occur. However.· advocates of the balanced growth theory (principally
N1U'kes and Rosenstein·Roc;fan) contend thai inelasticity of foreign demand. particularly·
for agricultural output. and balance of payments constraints, preclude a resort to increased
exports and imports as remedies for a lack of balanced domestic growth.
z. Key-Sector or Unbalanced Growth
_.. __~v~l different~v~4Ii()nJ· of th~Uh~ry__()Lunballln~~-.Wth-.-ha~~_ad.Yan-«d. .._.._. _
~e principal versions are the collow~ng:·
.a.. ROItow. viewing economic growth in historical· perspective. has observed that
wherever marked. and sustained economic development has occurred. one or. two
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sectors seem to have played a "leading" role, in the sense that, the growth of this sector
or sectors has been far more rapid than that of the economy as a whole. In the Case
of British growth, for example. the textile industry in the 18th century played such a
leading role; in the U.s., railroad development in the 19th century allegedly played a
similar role. In Japanese development. at the end of the 19th and the early 20th century.
agricu1:ure. and the textile and steel induJtries grew sharply ahead of the rest of the
economy; while in Sweden's developmC'.'1t. timber production. and industrier: directly
related to it. seem to have led the country's economic growth.
b. Viewin~ the problem of growth from the standpoint of planning. rather than
history. Singer and others have aiticized the balanced growth agrument not so much on
grounds of desirability as on grounds of feasibility. Because the shortage of resources
available for investment in underdeveloped countries i~ so aitical. they argue that
there is a compelling need to concentrate these scare resources in particular fields. The
particular fields in which scarce resources should be concentrated are those which yield
increasing retu:ns to scale. and which are likely to generate external economies. or
"spillover" effects. that in tum will stimulate investment in other industries. Such fields
comprise especially the so-called "social overhead" activities. that provide "infra·
structures" on which potential new industry depends. e.g. railroads. roads. power. and
river valley development.
c. Instead of emphasizing t.lte shortage of resources for investment. another version
of the unbalanced growth argument focuses on the shortage of entrepreneurial and
decision-making ability. in both government and the private sector. u the pnncipal
obstacle to accelerated growth in underdeveloped countries. There is both a static and a
dynamic aspect of this argument. The static aspect involves the notion that the limited
available supply of managerial and decision·making ability should be concentrated in a
few sectors because of the probable economies of scale from 10 doing. and the danger
that dispersing scarce talent might result in ineft'ectuality. The dynamic aspect of the
argument stresses the need to increase the available supply of such scarce managerial and
decision-making ability. Thus. Hirschman argues that the way to stimulate and evoke
additional supplies of these resources is by concentrating on only a very few sectorI, and.
in the process. deliberately creating bottlenecks in lOme seeton and surplUlel in othen.
The contention is that these bottlenecks Md surplUlel are likely to serve as lignals and,
stimuli which will attract latent entrepreneurship. u well as latent savings. to move
into other seeton which can relieve the obvious bottlenecks' or can, utilize the obvious
surpluses. New industria which. though they rely heavily on importJ for their initial
sources of inputs. require inputs that can eventually be produced :at home. are CODIidered
as especially promising candidates for emphasis in this sequence of pllUU1ed. uneven growth.
For example. if domestic resources exist for mining iron ore and making coking c:aal.
________ t"Stahli.hing R steel mJIing millwhirh' It fint tBeI- imported pig or Iteel iagoCl, mipt _
well be expected to have stimulative efFects on domestic enterprise and savings. The
existence of the functioning· market for imported pig and steel ingoti· would tend to
stimulate domestic enterprise to replace imports by indigenous production. In Hinchman'.
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•·view, such sequential, int~dustry "linkages" are likely. to play a decisive role in
economic development.
Now, what general implications do those ditfering views on balanced and unbalanced
growth 'have in the light of Korean conditons? :Ie my judgement. thc arguments for at
least some unbalanced growth, as advanced by Singer and Hirschman, do have relevance
in Korea. The scarcity of available resources docs require a concentrati~n of effort in
fields that can yield economies of scale, and external economies or spillovers. From
both standpoints, selection 0' the 'power and agricUltural sectors for cncentration appears
sensible. Power is subject to fairly considerable economies of scale, and, over time, can
have marked stimulative effects on industrial development. Emphasis on agricultural
investment and productivity seems justified because of the predominant role of the agri·
culturnl sector in the economy as a wholt:, the existence of a number of probably high-
yielding agricultural investment opportunities! and the need to widen the domestic
market for industrial output by raising agricultural income. At the same time.
however, it is important to keep in mind several warnings and qualifications in applying
the ,notio~ of key·sector or unbalanced growth to planning economic development in
Korea.
First, though judicious concentration certainly has its merits and its stimulative
deets, such concentration must clearly be kept in bounds or the resulting balance
of payments. and/or price effeets can seriously, disrupt .the entire developmental
effort.
Second, economic development is a long-run proLiem. The. achi~ent of self·
sU$taining growth ,will not bellccomplished. by Korea'S first five-year plan, nor ever its
~nd, or third. As each devc:lopment, program paves the way for the,next one, the
sectors requiring emphasis and priority are 'very likely to, need modification and altera·
tion. Moreover, s~ors that were previously emphasized, and then de-emphasized, may
in' a later plan rC':f\lire re-em~hasis, and a corresponding re·allocation of.investment.
(India's decision to retum in its Third Five'Year Plan to the heavy emphasis on the
agricultural sector contained in the First Plan is a case in point.) In effect, I would
suggest that Korea's development strategy, while requiring concentration and emphasis
on a few sectors, will require sequential modification in successive five'year plans of the
particular seeton that are emphasized. ' "
Third, though there is a need for concentration, thiJ need still leaves UDaJiawered ~e
vital questions concerning thetlmouJl,t ofCo~centnltion, and the fta,tiCIIlsr., lIe1fWI to be
emphasized. While it is certainly true that there is a critical ~~ to, exPand power
capacity Ai a hue ,for' ind~liZAtion"reCognition of:~ need does not determine the
amount of the requisite expansion dUrlDg the first:five year plan period~' Should the
target ro~ expansion be 480 megawatts" or half' this n~mber? Should·conCentration on
th.e Pc?wcr ,sector be interpreted interms of,expandini coal «;:ai-city and themiligeneraton _
,. tOgether (i.e. in a "blll81lf'ed" way), ,or should there be a deliberate, over-expansion of
coal·mirilitg capaci,ty, anti oCcoal·refining capacity, in ofder to provide high caloric coal,
I 'See pp. 14 below.
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for export purposes above the needs of thermal generating capacity at home? These are
obviowy aitical questions which are nC\t answered by a simple decision to .-.:cncentrate
on power as one of the key sectors in the five-year plan. Yet answers to. and decisions
about. these questions are essential if the plan is to be an efficient and responsible one.
F"mally. the decision to focus emphasis on two or three sectors does not obviate the
need for explicit and detailed analysis and decision concerning the basic components of a
new plan. The basic componenb of a national development plan are:
a. A clear and quantitative statement of national economic objectives. in the aggre-
gate and by particular sectors;
b. A public sector investment program. arrived at by detailed cost-benefit analyses
of various alternative projects and representing an optimal. or at least reasonable. means
of achieving the stipulated objectives;
Co A definition of rough and appoximate production and investment goR1s for the
private sector;
d A caref'ul analysis of mearis and!OUl'CeS of financing for the public and private
sector investment programs.
or course. none of these components should be regarded as firm and unaltenlble.
Effective planning requires a continual feedback of experience into the revision and
modification of objectives, and or public and private investment targets for achieving
these objectives, whilt the plan is being implemented. A decision to concentrate on a
few sectors does not. in other words, alter the need for these basic and difficult com-
ponents of effective planning.
III
SOME SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE STATEMENT OF
"METHOD AND PRINCIPLES OF THE· NEW
FIVE- YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN"
I haw reviewed the draft statement on "Method and Principles" by the ~omic
Development Council. There is much of value in the EDC draft. But instead· of
dwelling on what is of value, let me focus lpecifically. on commenf.l and suggestions for
making it into a more helpful guide to the lubltantial work remaining to be done to
formulate a comprehensive, and logically consistent. plan of which the country can. be
proud While recognizing the need for speed. r would re.emphasiZe that pIannmg UR
difficult and time-consuming talk. In view of this fact, and of the considerable work
remaining to be done. I would strongly suggest that the next year. through the ~nd of
; 196---Lk-comiderec:La._~J'W'..-.D!lring this time It,.,.. should be placed on
effective implementation of the National Construction Service, and of only the top
priority power and coal projects, and of a strengthening of agricultural e·xtension services
and completion of the large number of small irrigation projects already under way. AlIo.
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during this preparatory period. formulation and crystalization cf the new Five-Year Plan
should be completed. with a target date of January 1962 for beginning the first year of
the plan period. ;
It. is my understanding that the main purpose of the EOO statement of "Method and
Principles" is to guide the planning work which is under way by BOO itself, as well as
to guide the preparation of inputs for the Plan by the several ministries. particularly
Commerce and Indumy, and Agriculture. Beyond this, the stltement may serve as an
introduction or preamble to the Plan document when it takes final fonn. With these
broad purposes in mind, I have the following specific suggestions to make concerning
additions to, or clarification of, the present BOO draft. The suggestions should be con-
sidered in the light of the preceding comments on the KOl"tan economic situation (Part
I), and on multi-sector va. key-sector growth (part D) since several of the suggestions
are based on the earlier discussion.
1. The Pint Pive-Year Plall, alld KOfta'. LOlli-Tum Ecollomic Growth
Self-sustaining economic growth can be ovenimply characterized as a process in
which.growth in aggregate real .income is maintained for a protracted period, at a rate
substantially above the rate of population growth, with increments in income and im·
provements in technology at each point of time providing savings and skills for
subsequent increments and improvements, wilhDul a chronic balance of payments deficit.
The aim of development planning is to move a country more closely and more rapidly
toward self.sustaining growth. But, however rapid the movement. it requires long'~range
dort. Five years are a relatively sh.:)rt period in terms of the time·homen that is relevant
for realizing self-sustaining growth. Although it is useful to break the long.range eff'ort
that is required in to convenient segments for planning and evaluation purpoRes, it
should be recognized that each plan period is only jJtJrl of a longer-term effort.
From this standpoint. Korea's first Five.Year Plan should be regarded as the tint
of several plans to follow. Sectoral emphuis in the first Plan sh~d be ,considered as
subject to change later in the sequence. The Plan should try to bUild on and from an
existing situation. and in turn to lay a buis for further growth in sublequent periods.
But it should 1UJt be oversold as being itself lItt long.range program. or as likely to
achieve .a "takeoff''' oy the end of a single five-year period.
2. Nadoullcollomic ObjectiYes . '
It is important that the objectiws of Korca';o Plan be both realistic and challenging.
If they are unrealistically ambitious, they run the risk of substantial •shortralls and dis·
appointment. If they are too meager, they run the risk or invidious comparison with
North Korean development I In the light of these conflicting risks. I would suggest
------ thit the followmg 6I'08d oojectives .be gI~n co~laerabonm' revumg the statement of
"Method and Principles": .
a. During the plan period, the targeted average tlftftUtll 'til, of ,,_It in uIi"""l
I See pp. 2-3 above.'
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produet in constant prices should be something in the neighborhood of 5 per cent to5. per cent a year. Such a rate may be considered as reasonable in the light of recent
exPerience; yet it is challenging. both in the sense that. jf attained. it would reverse a
downward trend of recent years. and also that it would be somewhat higher than the
rate of growth aimed at in man)" other Asian countries. India's Third Five-Year Plan.
for example. envisages an average annual growth rate of 5 per cent for the 1961-1966
period. To guide planning. it would be worthwhile to fonnulate the average rate of
growth in terms of a gradually rising rate: say. 4.-4.5 per' cent in the rim year; 4.5 to
5 per cent in the second; 5 to 51 per cent in the thIrd; 5. to 6 per cent in the fourth;
and 6 to 6. per cent in the last year of the plan.
b. With such·an aggregate growth rate. JJIT cajJita ctm.rUmjJtion could be increased
by perhaps 1.5 per cent per year. Given an annual rate of increase in population of
about 2 per cent. this woted mean that nearly 3.5 per cent of the 5 to 51 per cent
increase in aggregate real income would be required for consumption purpose.' (Of
course. if the rate of growth in population can be red'Jccd, a higher rate of increase in
per capita consumption would be possible with the same rate of increase in aggregate
consumption).· The remainder of the increase in aggregate real income could, with
appropriate measures to increase domestic taxes and savings, be dvided between reducing
the country's import surplus and further increasing domestic capital formation.
Co Consistent with these targets, it would be poaible to increase employment signi-
ficantly. Assuming a rise in the average productivity of labor of. say, 2 per cent a yesr.
employment would increase by about 270,000 a year.' With an assumed rise in labor
productivity of 3 per cent per year. 190,000 new jobs would be created.
3. Capital R.equireJDeDti
What would be the ;rwtlt",tftI requirements RaIOCiAted with these targets? Assuming
a crude incremental capital-output coefficient of 3. the targetJ would require that grou
capital formation increase from about 13 per cent of GNP in 1960 (about 275-280 billion
hwan of which perhaps 25-30 per cent can be roughly attributed to Korea's import
surplus). to an average of about 16.5 per cent over the Plan period. Relating the increUe
in inw~ent requirements to the annual increases in national product mentioMdin (2)
(a) above, investment would have to be railed to 13.5 per cent in the fint Plan year.
13.5-151 in the second Year, 15-16.5% in the third; 16.5-18% in the fourth'; and 18-
I IC q is the desired annual percentage increue in per capita COllIumption, p the annual
percentage increue in population, and 0 the share or coDiumptloft in national product, then the
percentage increase in product required. or absorbed, by increasing consumption is: C(q+p+qp).
(0 i. about 95 per cent or GNP in Korea).
• In view or the hilh and perha.. miag rate or population IfOWth in Korea. it would be
desirable to include in the .tatement or "Method and Prineipl~...".-~ndin the Plan itlelt. rererence
to meuures to control population growth. India'. experience in this field. and the reference
which have been made to the problem in each or Its th~ Five-Year Plam, would be worth
studying eareCuJly.
J Bued on the auumption that, in 1960. there were 7.8 million pinCully employed. the
GNP in current prices was 2,047 bilUan hwall.
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19.5" in the fUth. These are very big numbers absolutely and relative to other Asian
countries. They might warrant some initial inaease in external capital availabilities-
both from foreign government and private sources, and would certainly require increases
in domestic taxes and domestic avings. But. by the third or fourth year of the Plan
period. it should be possible. and certainly would be desirable. for increases in domestic
avings and taxes to be increasingly used ftl)I to raise investment further. but to Rducc
and replace the import surplus as a soun:e of financing for domestic capital formation.
4. The Need for B&idmt Ule of Capital
Accelerated growth requires not only increased capital formation. It requires as
well inaeased attention to the efficient use of existing capital. and to better allocation
of new investment. In the light of the impressionistic. but impressive, indications of
inefficient use and allocation previously referred to,' I believe that the opportunities
for Korea's Jevelopment to profit from increased efficiency are tremendous. These op'
portunities inclucle the use of capital to increase utilization of idle labor and of potentially
cultivable upWid areas. The concept behind the National Construction Service makes
very good Ituse from both standpoints. fu the short run-i.e. in the time period encom-
passed by the. first Plan the payoff's from more efficient use and allocation are very likely
to be considerably greater than those from ino:eased capital formation.
These considerations should be empi1asized in the revised statement on "Method and
Principles". There are two specific suggestions I would like to put forward in this con'
nection:
a. Consideration should be given to the desirability of addhg to the ptoposed Plan' a
new "strategic" or "key" component. which would stress meuurta to rationalize govern-
ment enterprises. to increase the productivity of existing investment. and to improve the
allocation of new investment. Some of these measurel are institutional and organizational
Many may require some initial increase in operating expenditure. (e.g. pay inc:reuel for
tax UIeIIOrs). or capital expenditures on existing facilities (e.g. for improving transmisaion
lines to reduce transmiIIional power 108llel). The desirability of such incremental expen.
ditures should be appraiJed from the standpoint of their contribution to increased yield
or productivity as an alternative to expenditures for new plant and equipment..
b. In making allocative decisiom, particularly with respect to the choKe of new
government projects. ~d to the use of KRB and KAD fundi and of counterpart for
financing private .projects. explicit criteria should be applied to estimate and compare
the IOCiAl marginal productivity of alternative projects. ·These criteria shOuld make· tile
of reasonable and explicit lOCial accounting, or "shadow" pricea in cues where there
are strong reaIOm for expecting that a divergence exiJta between prevailing market pricea
_. ~~~_llDd prices which would RCC11rntely "Aerr the relDtive abundance and SCP'!'iries at rlnmesric
and imported Commodities and services. A memorandum on this subject is attached as
Appendix 3 to this report.
I See pp. 1-2 above,
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5. Emphasis 011 the Power Sector
In the relatively short time I have been here. it has obviously not hem possible for
me to study this key segment of the proposed Plan as carefully or as thoroughly as I
would have liked. Nor have I seen the detailed anaIaysis of the specific program for ex-
panding thermal and hydroelectric power which is presently under consideration. With
these qualifications and I't3erV8.tions in mind. there nevertheless seem to me to be two
specific suggestions which may be relevant to plans for expanding power generating
capacity.
a. At the same time as consideration is given to the amount of needed expansion
in new capacity. and to the preferred combination of hydro and thermal power for
providing this capacity. more attention should be given to measures that waI save exist·
ing power. and increase the productivity of power use. In this connection. it is my un-
derstanding that almost 3S per cent of current power production is lost. either through
technical losses in transmission. or through "unrecorded losses" representing power con-
sumption that is not paid for. (The Korean draft Three-Year Plan of January 1960
estimated th:.t the first type of transmissonaI loss represented about two thirds of the
total loss. while one third. or about 12 ~r cent of total power production. represented
unrecorded losses.) Clearly. while investment costs are incurred to expand new capacity.
the gOvernment shoold consider it a matter of high priority to incur both the admini-
strative and possibly the investment costs required to reduce substantially these large
losses from .::urrent power production. If recovery of these losses is appreciable. it may
be possible t .• reduce lOme of the investment requirements for providing new capacity.
b. Estimates of the generating capacity required to satisfy the present excess of
power demand over available supply range from 30 megawatts to 80 megawatts. while
forecasts of the probable annual rate of increase in power generating requirements range
between S and 10 per cent per annum.\ There is thus considerable uncertainly cOn·
cerning the extent of the present power deficit. and the probable rate of growth. in
power requirements. More apeci1icaVy. the unccatainly relates to both the price elasticity
of demand for power. and to the income elasticity of demand over the next several yean.
I would therefore suggest that consideration be given to the somewhat paradoxical policy
of preceding or accompanying future iraerltlltl in power generating capacity with lOme
;ftcrtal:1 in power rates charged to industrial users, at 1M, al t1l", ;1 HIiM to Hllflfil/ltl
POW" thmtmd UMn tlu /WIll'" ;Mwtrial 'til' "ruelu". It is mainfeatly inefficient to charge
a rate which leaves An UIWltisfied demAnd. tiM JuU Jldli611 rut 1~lt;,.t tdJdtity. In gene·
ral. for given capacity. a sufficiently high rate should be charged which. while maintain-
ing full use. allocates the lindted available supply to the usen for whom it will have
the hilhest yieklJn-J)ra~whatthis poli~u1dmean is that if industrial ratel aIL.- .
raised. as planned. by SO per cent this year. they ought to be raised still further as or
I The higher figures come from the Report on Electric Power Supply by the; Commonwealth
Auociatea. Incorporated, of JacUon, Mir.hipn. dated Dec. 29. 1960,
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before new generating capacity is cmstcd, if an unsatirjiItI dtmDM ptrnsts at tht fttW
rtdu.
6. Bmphuis 011 the ApicultUft! Sector
As in the c:ase of the power sector, it has not been possible for me to explore this
key-sector in any reasonable detail during my brief stay in Korea. Nor have I been able
to get a very clear or precise idea COI:cerning the specific components of the proposed
agricultual plan that is now under consideration. Still, there seem to be a number of in-
teresting :and potentially highly productive possibilities in this field Some of them ought
to be mentioned explicitly in the statement on "Method and Pm: ','les," in anticipation
that they will be more fully elaborated in the detailed plan itself. These promising pos-
sibilities include: strengthening the existing extension services; attempting to develop
upland areas for resettling population and for cultivation of ramie and other cash crops;
tidelands reclamation; developing and using powered limeston~ to combat soil acidity;
stimulating livestock production, particularly for export purposes; and gradually mechaniz-
ing double-cropping areas, using small rototillers or hand tracton, along dle lines of
Japanese experience.
7. Need for • Bi,h Marlin.! R.eiIlyatmelit CoeSiciellt
Sucx:asful economic growth, especially if it is to rely decreasingly on foreign aid, re-
quires that a disproportionately high slJBre of increments in real income be saved and
reinvested. Technically, the marginal savings coefficient needs to be substantially higher
than the average ratio between savings and current income. Consequently, in revising
the statement on "Method and Principles," there should be a discussion of SOlll'CeS of
financing which would stress the need for increasing tax collecitons as well as encourag-
ing private savings. In this connection, the recent policy of the Ministry of Finance in
lowering tax rates in order to discourage evasion, and hopefully to increase tax yields, is
interesting,~ if seemingly paradoxical. I would suggest that this policy be combiitcd
with some increase in the salaries of the roughly 2,000 tax assesson, that might include
an incentive provision to relate salary increues to increases in assessments and collec-
tions. It would also be desirable to refer in the revised statement to th~ important role
that normalization of interest rates can play in increasing available private savings,
provided that price stabilization is reBSOflably effective.
I. The ..ole of die MDitaq
Given the size of Korea's defense budget, which hu been previously referred to, it
is important to ask whether and how the military effort can be used to complement
economic development. There would seem to be a number or promising opportunities.
-------.,--- .-The UIt of MJUIe,iniHwy (acti fur load baUting alwaiutibn piujeCbJ Wide! tliC Na
tional Construction Service is one imaginative example that would appear to warrant
expanaion. More generally, periodic deployrr,:n,t of military forces in areas away from
the DMZ (Demilitarize,:! Zone) to work' in SmAller groupll with and for rural communi-
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ties in construction. and in new upland deveiopment and resettlement. projects .should
aJsc, be given consideration. I It is true that the communitists make U!Ie of techniques
similar to this. But this is not a good reason for South Korea to refrain from doing so.
Another opportunity would appear to lie in trying to revise and. supplement the
standard training· given to draf'tess. with· avil!':W tclWU'd inculcating skills and trades that
would be useful in civilian life. A manpower survey of the.probable requiremeDts for
various kinm of skilled labor during the First Five-Year Plan, and sublequently, would
be helpful as a first step in deciding how the military might participate in developing
such skills. In a developing country, it is probably useful, if unorthodox, to regard a
large military establishment like the Korean· army as. in part. a wcational training
institution.
Finally. consideration might be given to developing a military establishment which
replaces some manpower by some "infrastructures". like roRcU, porta and airfield. in an
effort to obmm. for tift tfJUtll thfnu, DUtltzy, a roughly equivalent military capability and
a cot.siderably enhanced set of economic side-effeas.
Clearly, these suggestions would require a major reorientation of the thinking and
attitudes of the military 6tablishment, both in Korea and in the United States. And I
do not pretend to know how to accomplish this change of attitude. Inevitably. it will
take time. But it would seem advisable. in formulating the Five·Year Plan. to refer to
the potentially important role of the military, and to solicit support and suggestions
from the Ministry of National Defence concerning wayw in which the military effort
can more effectively contribute to capital.formation and skill·formation in furtherance
of Korean economic growth.
IV
PROPOSALS FOR REORGANIZATION OF
ECONOMIC PLANNING IN KOREA
Daniel Lee, Director of the Bureau of Planning in the Ministry of ReconJtruCtion.
has described to me the general outline of the Pl'Opaied reorganization of economic
planning in the Korean government. In general, as I undentand the propoalJ they
seem quite sensible, and I have given my oral comments to Mr. Lee. Very briefly. the
only specific suggestions that I have to make on thillubject are the following:
t. It would seem to me desirable to consider establishil'lg a cabinet level PlaMing
Commission roughly along the lintl followed in India. The Planning CommiIIion would
be chaired. as in India. by the Prime Minister. with the head of the Pl'OpcRd Office or
.~nomic_ P~L~c,;tjpLas--..Yi~~.Chairman. .The remainder of the CommiIIion'.
membership would consist of ministers of the principal ministries concerned with economic
• The on-soing work or the Viet Namese mUitary in orpniain,. adminiJtmnl and pro.
tectinr .ettlement or the Centnl Plateau retion would warnnt Itudy in titl. connection.
1S
developmenL
2. The proposed Office o( Economic Planning should provide the staff work (or the
pJpnnmg Commission and report regularly to iL In addition, there should be a separate
evaluation office, irldependent or the Office o( Economic Planning, that would also report
to the Planning Omunission. The purpose o( this evaluation unit would be to conduct
a· continuing appraisal or progrt.ss and eJiectivenas o( the Plan, and o( gaps between
production and invaunent tar8ets on the oneha:xi, and accomplishments on the other.
Such evaluation should be (ed back into the Planning Office, through the Planning
Commission, in order to assure that the Plan remains flexible during the Plan period,
and that both the on-going Plan, and the (ormulation o( subsequent plans, can profit
(rom the experience being gained in carrying out the current Plan. For obvious reasons.
it is highly important that this evaluation unit be staffed by competent and vigorous
penonnel, and that its status be independent o( the Office 'l( Economic Planning.
",I"
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APPENDIX 1: Work Assignment
March 4, 1961
Dr~ Charles Wolf, Jr.
The Rand Corporation
California, U.S.A.
Dear Dr. Wolf:
I have the pleasure of transmi tting in, th'e a't~'Bcbed a COpy
of work assignment on assist~ng the Ministry of ~econ~truc_~
t ion in checking of consistenci es ,review. of a1ter~~tive~
'and other necessary' .theo.re.tical. gUid.~nces"necessa~:y io.~
drawing a long7'"range d~v&-1.opm~nt plan. .. . ,. <,'
r would like to express how muc'h we treasure 'YC;U~ ':~f~it
to Korea and will be looking, forward.. t~ g~t, .valua'b.:t~, .as:,
sistanoe from you.
I wish you pleasant stay an~ successful missio.n~
Sincerely yours,
(S)
sltl Tae Wan Son
____~____ ~ . .__ . "l~l.~.i~r__._~
SCOPE OF WORK ASSIGNMENT
1. ComparadYe Bmuacio..., of Vuious Approaches ill PI.nnmg
A thecnetical evaluation or various approaches adopted for economic development is
desired by the ROK Government. This will serve as a policy guidance in preparing a
new long-range economic development pIan.
The Government of Kon:a is especially interested in getting a aitical appraisal of
appraeches with: (1) a limited number of sectors (leading sectors) and (2) a large
number of sectors. The appraisal is desired to be made on these various approaches in
relation to the planning agencies and the administrative machineries available in Korea.
It is felt that with the limited number ofeconomists available for economic planning
and the administrative machinery. inexperienced in implementing economic plans, the
frame of reference in planning should be as simple as posIIole.
2. Inmln.doe of the New PIa..
The Government has already undertaken the preparatory work for the new plan,
and is engaged at present in surveying the magnitude of funds avaiJable for investment
and in examining the feasibility or the propo&ed targets (or various seeton. The (ull
lCIle programming and planning will start as lOOn as the draft "Guiding Principles or
the F"lI'It Five.Year Economic Development Plan" hu been finalized. A aitical and
thorough appraisal on the "Guiding Principle" is therefore prerequisite.
5. R.eMpllizatio.. of the BcoeollUc At_del
A reorganization of the economic agencies of the Government hu been under
consideration. A brief appraisal of the propclled reorganization, in relation to the prop>
sitiODI to be made on the above items, is highly desirable.
, ;;.:,
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APPENDIX 2: Normalization of Interest Rates
TO: Mr. Lee Hahn Been DATE: March 20, 1961
Director, Budget Bureau, MOP
PROM: Charles Wolf, Jr.
SUBJECT: Normalization of Interest Rates
Purther to our conversation at the Pinance Ministry on
March 17, I am attaohing some comments and a suggestion I
have wri tten concerning the prOblem of -normaliz ing· in-
terest rates, which was referred to in the Pinanoe Minister's
talk on Pebruary 2S, 1961.
I am also attaching a copy of an earlier memorandum that
I wrote to Mr. Kim Chong Dai, Deputy Chairman of EDC, co'n'-
" '.','
cerning investment priori ties and profi tabili ty ra'~ios,
which is referred to in my c:omments on normalization of in~
terest rates.
, . ,
(S)
Charles Wolf, Jr.
:3 Attachments
1. -Some Comments on Interest Rates in Korea-
:3. COpy of memorandum to Mr. Kim Chong Da1
ce: Honorable Tae W~n Son
Honorable Kim Yong Kap
Honorable Kyun Hi Tehah
______ 1l~~~an1e_l.K1e Hong Lee
SOME COMMENTS ON INTEREST RATES IN KOREA
As I unckrstand the structure of interest rates and loanable funds in Korea. (and it
is nota particularly easy subject to understand). there are three principal and separated
markets for loanable funds. The rust is the free market. where rates run 30 to 45 per cent
per annum. Presumably the higher end of this range applies to longer term loans. given
equivalent credit worthiness of long and short term borrowers. The second is the com·
mercial bank market. where rates are set by the Monetary Board with a rate of 171
per cent per annum applying to capital (i.e. long term) loans. and from 8 to 181 per cent
applying to operating (i. e. short term) loans. Again. presumably lower rates are charged
on short term loans of otherwise equivalent risk than on long term loans. Finally. there
are the government lending institutions. i. e. the Korean Reconstruction Bank and
Korean Agriculture Bank. Actually. this category might be further divided into two
categories because the SOUl"CeS of funds for the two institutions often dift'er. as do the
type and terms of loans which they makeI
On loans extended by the KRB and KAB. interest rates vary widely and peculiarly.
For example. the rate on capital loans varies between 3 and 15 per cent. and often there
is a wiele variation in the rate charged on the same kind of loan to the same borrower
depending simply on the particular fund from which KRB or KAB makes the loan. The
rate on operating loans by the KRB similarly varies between 6 and 16 per cent. and the
structure of short term rates on loans extended by the KAB covers a ronilarly wiele
range.
As I undentand it. the Finance Minister's view of "normalization of interest rates."
applies to the first and second categories above (i.e. free market and commercial bank
rates). Normalization is construed in terms of reducing or eliminating the gap in rates
between these two markets in order to stimulate the flo\1 of deposits and savings into
commercial banks. to reduce the tendency that now exists for borrowen to seek loans
f'rom the commercial banks in order to relend at higher rates in the free market. and
to reduce the need for the more or less arbitrary rationing 0( c::ommercial banking fundi
which often leads to favoritism and preferential treatment toward borrowen on inap-
propriate grounds. I believe this concept of normalization to be a sound one. It should
tend to promote lOme additional private savings. and to permit lOme redirection in the
allocation of existing IIlI.vings. Though it will exercile considerable preuure on existing
bulineaes for whom the COlt of capital is a major COlt of production. this pmsure should
tend to encourage both efficient operations and .elf·financing of plant expansion by the
I Although National Bonell and Reconltruetion Bondi provide lOme or the loanable fundi
UJed by the govemment banking Inltltutionl and though they carry a nominal interelt rate or
------+,... CleAt, (rGm IA Ic:GA9mic: "icwpoiat I WGuld be lacJla-d to pl.,.. them dOle to the 6nt , <l e
rree market) category rather thin the third category. AI I undmtand it. purchaaeft or govern.
ment bonda. although they receive a nominal rate or 5 per cent, are typically able to tie their
purchue to p:ererentlal treatment rrom the government or I IOrt that more nearly reflects the
30 to 40 per cent dilcount at which government bonda Ire lublequently traded on the rree market.
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affected firms.
In the further comments 1 have to make 1 would like to take up what 1 consider to
be a second aspect of normalizing interest rates, namely that of partially reducing· the
tremendous disparity between interest rates charged by gc'·emment institutions. in .the
third category above and those charged in the first two categories, and perhaps still
more important, reducing the .disparities on . loan rates within the tlilid category itself..
My impression is that this wide disparity among the various rates ~arged by the
government lending institutions represents a strong stimulus to' a misallocation. of new
investment.
Before pursuing this second aspect of interest·rate normalization, there is a basic
question which is of considerable importance for planning ee;onomic dev~opment! w~ch.
needs to be considered: namely the question of why interest. rates- on developmental·
loans should be different from, that is to say lower than, the market rate? There are.
numerous reasons which can be given to answer this question:
1. For types of investment which yield external economies or spillover tffects that
benefit other parts oC the economy, and which cannot be appropriated by the owners
of the particular investment concerned, the interest rate ch8rged .to the borrower will
generally have to be less than the market rate if the investment is to be Undertaken· at
all. Examples of types of investment that' yield external economies are railroads.. roads,
land reclamation, and multipurPose hydroelectric power projects. Of coUrse, whether·
and to what extent such e~t~.economy.yielding i~vesiments shotild' be undertaken
depends on' some 'estimate of how laige' and reliable the pOtential external economies
will be. .. . .
. .
2. Development planning implies that the judgement of Poiitically resporisible
planners concerning the appropriate time discount differs from the market's judgement.
Given a politically determined decision concerning the desirability of l~g term growth!
a project with a yield which rises over time· should not have itS future yield as' heavily
discounted as the market interest rate would discount it. Hence, the int~t·.~te·applied
to projects with a long term pattern of yield should be lower than the market rate.
3. Certain kinds of irlvestment may entail non·economic benefits which the govi:m.
ment wishes to encourage. Examples· might be in the fields of hoUsing," ~uial deWl0P.
ment, and scie.ntific research. My own judgement would be that for projeCts ()r tlus sOrt,
a strong case can .be made for using appropriated funds ~.~ source or. finin~g. ~or
government projects rather than using preferential interestnites ils a concealed sublidy.
'4. To compensate for divergencies that exist l>etweat the 'lOCial and the private c:osfj'
of other factors of production, such as labo~ or foreign exclumge, it ~. be .atlued thAt'
inter~st rat~s should be modified in order to improve investment alloeations: Thus if the
_________e..ming-.-exchang,. 'rate is' over.,,:iJ"ed, the prhr.ate profitability of' impnn·repJpcing or
export.increasing industries 'may be leu than the social profimbilit;,. Under th~ cil'cuma::
tances a lower interest rate may be jUstifiable to compeNate fur' luch impefrectiODi iii
prevailing market prices. (This point is c:IisculIIIed rurtherin my' memor8ndum' on inVest.
21
ment priorities which is attached.) My own judgement would be that under these
circumstances a direct subsidy would be preferable to preferential interest rates to achieve
the desired effect, because a subsidy is more overt and identifiable.
In summary then, I would say that the best reasons for a divergence between intertst
rates on development loam and interest rates in the free market are the reasons mentioned
under (1) and (2) above: namely. external economics. and ch~ce between social
and private time preference. However. I would emphasize the risks and dangers of
having interest rat~ on development loam at too low a level. Such a policy promotes
the inefficient use of capital in several ways. It stimulates capital intensive techniques of
production, and it dilutes the rationing effect that a higher interest rate woUld have in
tending to weed out· firms which are less efficient in· the use of other factors of production
than capital. Where, :IS in the case of the KRB and KAB, interest rates on development
loam are not only far below the market rate but also involve quite disparate rates for
different kinds of loans, and often different rates for the same kind of loan to different
borrowers (and at different times even to the same borrower), the resulting tendencies
toward inefficiency. favoritism, and misallocation are intensified. Of course, the problem
of disparate interest rates involves the Gombined Economic Board as well as the KRB
itself. Many of the disparities and preferential treatment for some categories of KRB
loans derive from CEB criteria governing the use of counterpart for lending purposes by
government institutions. For example, these criteria involve preferential treatment for
smaI1 as against medium and large enterprises. and lower interest charges during a
construction period of indefinite duration (which would. predictably tend to discourage
rapid completion). I have looked at these criteria and terms fairly carefully, and without
going into details I believe they could benefit substantially if they were revised along
the lines of greater concern for the yield on capital, and fewer attempts to discriminate
among firms and industries in regard to interest rates.
In the light of the.e comments, I would make the following suggestions concerning
the general problem of interest rate normalization:
1. In addition to normalizing interest rates in regard to the free market and the
commercial bank rates. normalization should be construed as warranting both lOme
reduction in the disparity between rates on government loans and the commerciaUi'te
market rates, as well 88 reducing or eliminating the disparity among the various rates
charged on government loans by the KRB and the KAB.
2. Instead of a range on KRB and KAB loans which now covers from 3 to 15
per cent, I would suggest something like a 12 or 14 per cent rate with interest and repay.
ment to begin at some stipulated time in the future, perhaps one or two yean to allow
for construction time. The. stipulated time would constitute an incentive to complete
conatruction rapidly.
In effect. applyinLlucluLunitary_rat~tLiQY-emm~nLlQllDJ woula constitute an
initial or /1rimtuy rationing device for screening .out projects or IODD applications which
do not yield at least this much internal rate of I n. Because the free market COlt of
capital will be substantially above this rate, the den. .nd for loanable funds would exceed
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the available supply at this unitary rate. Consequently the government 'lending,~tutiOtis
would have to ration the limited supply still further. For this purpose, they would need
a Itctmtltzry rationing' deVice. To provide such secondary raticining or developmentil
capital. the lending institutions might be instructed to take into explicit account the
external economy effects of proposed projects (i.e. the benefits created by a project
which are not appropriable directly by the project owner); and the exiStence of identi.
fiable divergencies between private and social cost of other factors of production because
of controlled or distorted market prices.' This would involve the use of. some estimate'of
social accounting prices in' making allocative judgements. along the lines described in
the attached memorandum on investment priorities. Finally. after the minimum yield
criterion represented by the unitary interest rate were satisfied. the lending institutions
should try to take into account the time pattern of yield in making their secondary
rationing decisions. If between two projects. both of which were able to meet the intel'eSt
rate criterion. one would tend to yield a rising pattern of output over time. preferenc;e
should be given to the latter.
• j I
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APPENDIX 3: Investment Priorities
'1'0:
PROM:
Mr. Kim Chong Dai
Deputy Chairman, EDC
Mr. Charles Wolf, Jr.
DATE: March 16, 1961
SUBJECT:. Investment Priori ties and Profi tabili ty Ratios
In the course of the discussions that I had on March 13,
1961 wi th the Economic Development Council, two questions
arose concerning investment priorities among different in-
dustries, and profi tabili ty ratios. At the time, I agreed
to write something down that might be of assistance in con-
nection wi th both of these problems.
The attached memorandum contains the comments I have to
make. The first part of the memorandum dealing with invest-
ment priori ties and investment allocation may not be entire-
ly clear, and I would suggest that if it is not clear it
might be a good idea to arrange a seminar meeting for perhaps
one hour to discuss and clarify it further.
(s)
Charles Wolf, Jr.
Attachment
cc: Honorable Tae Willn Son
Dr. Kyun Hi Tchah
IIr. Daniel Xie Hong Lee
._--- .._-----------_._._--_._-_... ----_._....._-- ----
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SOME COMMENTS ON INVESTMENT PRIORITIES
1. .b••mat Prioricia
The problem oC determining investment priortries is essentially a problem of deter·
mining the. relative social benefits and costs oC alternative projects. or industries, so
that the limited inputs that are avaiIablecan be allocated to those industries or projects
with the highest net sociaI yield. There are many aspects to this problem which are
not amenable to simple microeconomic.analysis. Cor example:
a. Different industriC'S have differingtime-patterDS oC output and yield. Some are
quick yielding. like textiles; others. like raiIroIlds'or steel. or power, bring returns
. that may be spread unevenly, uncertainly, andoYa' .a longer period. Comparing
such differing indust:rires requires both a precise knowledge oC the time-patterns,
and a planner's time-discount to permit intertemporal compariJons. n~ther oC
which is easy to estimate.
b. Because oC inter·industry complementarities, the returns from a particular induatrY
may depend on what otJur industries are abo going to be established. The ru'
returns from a fertilizer plant may. (or instance, be IeDlitive to whether or not
it supplies its own power, or· is built in conjunction with a hydro or thermal
power project. Alternative industrial ·j".,ftll,l' may be more appropriate (or
compariJon, rather than alternative industries. .
StilI, there is much to be said for miCl'O'eCODomic investment aiteria. Managerial
and resource limitations often preclude an elaborate inter·indUltry "package".approch,
particularly in the early stages or development when these' IimitatioDi. may'.be IIlOIt
acute.' Much developmental investment, particularly if financed through government
lending institutions, like the KRB, in conjun"otion with private financial puticipatiClll. is
IJourul to be on the basis oC separate indUltries and projects. Moreover. in many under-
developed countries, tangible progretll in the ahort·term or medium·term is· elleDtiaI. 10
that projects with uncertain, long-ttrm yields may just have to be def'emd. For all .theIe
reaIODi. it is highly important in development planning to have IeDlibleand CODIisteftt
micro-economic investment aiteria.
Let me turn now to the EOO's "Cormula ror determining investment priorities. I
believe it is a useful first·step in the direction of rational micro-econmic' aiteria. How·
ever;from J1e standpoint of its use as a guide to investment allocation. there are aeveral
shortcominll-lOme minor and lOme majlr-in this formula..Together, the IhcrtcOmilill
couIdlead to Ierious·mistakes in allocation. The Eoo formulator.In~t Priority
(loP.) oC individual· indurtries is:
______OLI..P.=V.+v.+Y.+Y.
Where V. =value. oC output 1!"JI COlt or imported materialJ,
V, =foreign exchangeaavings,
Ve =foreign exchange earnings.
2S
':i.
Vw="employment effect",
(2) . ,V...=wCV.,+V.+VJ,
w =W/p, where W=wages
and p:-: value of output.
To indicate what I believe the errors to be, let me first·add some variables to the
EDC list shown above.
M.t=CC8t of domestic materials and utilities services (eg. power, trans·
port) used in production•
. -M,=CQlIt of imported materials used in production.
r =interest.-rent, insurance. and indirect taxes.
c =capital consumption (depredation, repairs and maintenance).
p =prOfits before taxes.
--K -=fixed capital and inventories.
Using these terms as well as those in the EDC formula, the total value of output can be
expressed'as: . .
(3) P=M.,+M,+W+r+c+p
. (4) and V.=P-M,
The EDC· formula, (1), Presents several difficulties. Fint, it arrives at a priority
measure, ill llWtm, .without expressing the result in reiation to investment COltS, K. This
eanlead to obvious errors. Industry XI> for example, may generate a 'hwan value or
CV.+V.+V.+Vw) twit, as great as another' industry ·XI' but its capital COltS may be
tlam times as great. Clearly, XI shoUld be preferTeci to XI' bUt (1) would· accord priority
loXj.··· '
.... . Second, there are alia lOme problem. raised· by the separate components of (1).
CoDIider V." u defiried in (4). V. involves a subtraction of imported materials from
the value of output, but 110I of domestic materia1s -or wages. The· eeonmic me8ning of
V. iri the invatinent priority formula is that the "opportunity COlt", (i.e. the value in
alternative URI) of domestic· materia1s and doniestic labor is zero. This may·be tnie for
labor; it cert8.inly im't true for domestic materiaIJ and utilitits: That the -UIIe of V. may
lead to inefficient a1locative deCisions can be seen by the following example. Allume
that· two industries XI and XI are· Uike in every respect except for -two differences .
between them:
Ca) .The value of output minus import COltS ( = V.) of XI exceedl· that for XI by
··100.000 hwan;
(b) The value OCpoWerconsumed by XI exceeds that consumed by x, by D),OOO
·-hwan..
Clearly, x. should be preferred to XI> l:ut the I.P. formula will aceorct priority to XI'
The formula creates other aimilar troubles, as well. Instead of laboring the point
-'-- -"-'furthe~:..,. let me suggest an alternative. An ex 'on for invatment 'orities usin
"shadow" or accounting prica to estimate the IOCiaI marginal productivity of capital,
(i.e. the net contribution to value-added or invatment in • partiCular industry or
project), is:
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.(5) ·!'p·:,.P-aM.t-.sM,-rW+CS-Ocv,+V;}-c .
.-. '. '.:. K ...' .
Where a=ratio between. social costs of.domestic materials and market costs, .i.e..a
'f' .• ' " • •• • ' . , •
indicates the relative extent to wqich domestic are urukr/Jrict!-;. a=~1 ..wo~d
mean that social and market costs of domestic materials nre. equal..
/3 = ratio between costs of imported materials under an "equjlih.ium"~ge
rate and actual market costs, i.e. S indicates the relative tRltnNllUtZlitm of
the exchange rate...at the ~tive.ext!=l1t to .which im~~terials are
untkr/Jricttl; /3 = 2 would mean that the equilibrium exchange rate is
estimated at. twice .. the 1,300· Hwan/doIJar rate, or that importect materials
'. '.. ...'.. . . .
cost half what th~.would cost at an equilibrium rate.
r = ratio .~ social.· costs (i.e. '~QPportunity costs''). o£ .labor anti the
prevailing mark~. price ofI8bor, "i.~.~.r ..measures the ,. pr:oport.i~.petween
the margitUu productivity o{la~; and the ~g w.ige Gte~ r=O
would mean that the marginal productivity of labPr ~.ZCl'C?! ·r:~·:;':(would
mean that the marginal productivity is rula';rJI ..in si~, ~d .equal in
absolute value to the wage rate. (For whatever it may ~.worth, on the
basis of my two-weeks' impressions in Korea, ~.will .guess at ~ues for
the three parameters as follows: . ..,
1<a <1.5 ..
/3=2
r=O
I would emphasize that these values are merely guesses. They have lODle
impressionistic basis and I would be willing to argue for them - but
not very strongly).
In (5), the use of c.s -1) to weight (VI + VI) implies that where the exchange rate
is at an equilibrium level, i.e. /3= 1, no additional adjustment needs to be made for the
balance of payments effects of output. But where the equilibrium exchange rate exceeds
the existing rate, c.s> 1), an addition to P is needed to allow (or balance of payments
effects.
Subtracting capital consumption, c, and dividing the result by capital COltS, K, gives
an approximate measure of the relative social marginal productivity of investment,
adjwted to take account of divergences between social and private COlts. I would suggest
that this might be a practical and useful device to help determine investment priorities
among industries and projects, and to help allocate both government investment, and
government f~ and counterpart provided through the KRB for private investment.
2. pzoic a.dOl
At the March 13 meeting with Eoo, I was given a table entitled, "Profit RatiOl
for Detailed IndUStries; Korea, 1958:' The profit ratiOl listed in that table were calcu·
lated as 8 percentage of sales, and I mentioned at the time that, from the ltandpoint of
investment allocation and development planning, it was more relevant to consider profit
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in relation to capital investment rather than profit in relation to sales. The following
equations show how profit in relation to sales can be simply converted into profit in
relation to investment provide that the average capital-output ratio is known or can be
approximately estimated for each indmtry.
Let S=sales
V =value added
w=wages
m = materials and other non·wage COltS of production
p =!HOfits
a =average capital/output ratio=K/V. where K=fixed capital (plant and
equipment) + inventories
P = profitability as yield on sales ("profit ratio") = pIS
P'= profitability is yield on fixed capital+ inventories=p/K
Definitions:
(1) S =m+w+p
(2) V=S-m=w+p
Since
(3) P/a=~/~"
It follows that
(4) P'= -r= ; /-}.
_____• • ••_._ •• • ._••• _ •••_ ••_. __._. ._·_-----------------_. 0-_0 -
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